There are numerous remedies available to a landlord upon an event of default by a tenant under a lease. While a landlord's actual remedies will be dictated by the terms of the lease itself or generally determined by law, set forth below is a general discussion of some of those remedies.

RECOVERY OF RENT BY ASSUMPSIT

A. Substantive Law

The Landlord Tenant Act, cited at 68 P.S. §250.101 et. seq., governs procedures in actions by landlords against tenants. The Act does not create substantive causes of action; nevertheless, some county cases have explained that the Act may be the "sole source" of remedies for landlords. See Lenair v. Campbell, 31 D. & C. 2d 375 (Phila. Cty. 1984). Section 250.301 allows a landlord recovery of rent by assumpsit. Under this section of the statute, a landlord may recover rent in arrears under a lease from a tenant, as well as interest at the legal rate (six percent per annum) on the amount of rent due if under the circumstances the court finds it equitable. See 68 P.S. §250.301.

A suit to recover rent may be brought even when the lease in question is found to be invalid. In Pennsylvania, the statute of frauds requires that a lease for more than three years be in writing and signed by the party to be charged. See 68 P.S. §250.202. Nevertheless, under a lease of more than three years that has not been signed by the parties, the landlord may still maintain an action in assumpsit for the rental value of the premises while the lessee was in possession. See Folmar Corporation v. Logue, 418 Pa. 181 (1965). A judgment for unpaid rent will not bar a subsequent action for rent that accrues in arrears after the initial judgment. See Whitt v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 325 Pa.Super. 135, 472 A.2d 684 (1984).

B. Procedure

An action in this kind must be brought before the District Justice if the amount of rent is below the jurisdictional limit; otherwise, it may be brought in state court. See Ryder v. Prospect Park Realty Company, 211 A.2d 53, 206 Pa.Super. 108 (1965). An action to recover rent may be initiated at the District Justice level by filing a form called a Landlord-Tenant Complaint, provided by the District Justice office in the district in which the property is located. The form indicates the addresses of the property, the tenant, and the landlord, the relief sought, and the cause of action. The form must be filed with the District Justice, who will charge both filing and service fees. You need to provide the District Justice with 2 additional copies to serve upon the defendant.

The Complaint must include a notice to the defendant, much like the notice required by the Civil Procedure Rules. The notice is required by Rule 318 of the District Justice rules, and there is a form available at the District Justice offices. Although a different set of rules technically governs actions for possession and actions solely for unpaid rent, the complaint and notice forms are identical; having boxes in which to indicate which type of suit is being brought. Thus, the procedure found in Rules 501-582 applies whether a landlord seeks eviction or money damages only, even though the Rules are stated as governing actions for Possession of Property only.

Once the Complaint is filed, the District Justice will set a tentative hearing date within 7 to 15 days. Following service of the Complaint, which is done by the District Justice's office, the tenant has the opportunity to bring a counterclaim against the landlord. If the tenant files a complaint, the hearing will be set within 7 to 15 days from that filing. If the tenant fails to file a complaint, the original hearing date given to the landlord will be the date of the hearing. See District Justice Rule 504.

TRESPASS AND ASSUMPSIT

A. Substantive Law

An action based upon collection of rent in arrears usually arises when a tenant resides in property under a lease, and refuses to pay his obligation under that lease. An action in trespass and assumpsit, however, accrues when a tenant's lease has expired yet he continues to occupy the property. The only difference between the two actions is the measure of damages. When a tenant holds over at the end of a lease term he becomes a tenant "at sufferance." See Mack v. Fennell, 195 Pa.Super. 501 (1961). This means that the lessor has the option to treat him either as a trespasser or as a tenant for an additional term. The option by the landlord to elect how he wants to treat the tenant results in a different measure of damages for each election. See id. For example, when a landlord chooses to treat a holdover tenant as a tenant, not a trespasser, the tenant can only be liable for the value of his use and occupancy of the premises for the interval between the termination of the lease and his ejection. This value is most likely the same as the rent previously paid under the lease. If, on the other hand, a landlord chooses to treat a holdover tenant as a trespasser, the landlord can seek damages in the amount of his pecuniary loss for being out of the possession of the property while the tenant occupied it unlawfully. See id.

It is a question of fact whether a landlord is treating a holdover tenant as a trespasser or as a tenant. Courts have found that landlords begin treating tenants as trespassers once a court enters a judgment in ejectment. See id. If a tenant is treated as a holdover tenant, and not as a trespasser, courts will impose upon the tenant a term of occupation similar to his original lease term, if the original term was less than one year. If the term was for a year or more, the tenancy will be from year to year. See Routman v. Bohm, 194 Pa.Super. 413, 168 A.2d 844 (1961). Should the landlord change his mind and attempt to eject the tenant in the middle of that holdover term he may recover rent during the possession up to the time of eviction, but may not recover rent after the eviction to the end of the term. See DeLong Hook and Eye Company v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Company, 108 Pa.Super. 369, 164 A. 848 (1933). Courts also look at whether or not a landlord elects to collect rent during the time the tenant is a holdover to determine whether or not he is being treated as a trespasser. See Mack v. Fennell, 195 Pa. Super. 501 (1961). See also Taylor v. Kaufhold, 368 Pa. 538 (1951) (holding that the measure of damages in a case of trespass is pecuniary loss, and not the rental value of the premises for the time of possession).

B. Procedure

The procedure in an action for rent against a trespasser or tenant at sufferance is identical to the procedure involved in actions to recover rent under a lease.

ACTION IN EJECTMENT

A Substantive Law

The Pennsylvania Landlord Tenant Act in Section 250.501 allows a landlord the means to dispossess a tenant from the leasehold for three reasons, (i) the termination of the lease term, (ii) forfeiture of the lease, or (iii) failure of the tenant to satisfy rent payments. Substantively, the action in ejectment has been expressly acknowledged in Pennsylvania caselaw as the general method of recovering real property. See Soffer v. Beech, 487 Pa. 255, 409 A.2d 337 (1979). Section 250.511 specifically allows a landlord to recover possession by action of ejectment or by confessing judgment in accordance with the terms of the lease. See Commonwealth by Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 314 A.2d 333, 10 Pa. Comm. 596 (1974) (affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds) 329 A.2d 812, 459 Pa. 450, on remand 365 A.2d 442, 26 Pa. Comm. 399. See also Federman v. Pozsonyi, 529 A.2d 530, 365 Pa. Super. 324 (1987). See also Confession of Judgment, supra.
Because the statewide Landlord Tenant law does not enact any substantive law as to when a landlord has a right to evict, its provisions may be in conflict with local ordinances. See Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 115 A.2d 218, 382 Pa. 380 (1955). Before the Landlord Tenant Act was passed there existed some statewide caselaw regarding the substance of when a landlord may evict a tenant. For example, if the lease contains a provision permitting termination of the lease as of right by the landlord, the lessor need not give a reason when he wants to invoke that provision, without violating due process or constitutional rights. See Housing Authority of City of Pittsburgh v. Turner, 191 A.2d 869, 201 Pa. Super. 62 (1963).

1. Expiration of a lease term.

A landlord may obviously eject a tenant who holds over after the expiration of a lease term because that tenant can be treated as a trespasser. See Mack, 195 Pa.Super. 501. However, a landlord may not maintain an action in ejectment until the expiration of the lease, when the landlord has the exclusive right to possession of the property. See Brennan v. Shore Bros., Inc., 380 Pa. 283, 110 A.2d 410 (1955).

2. Forfeiture.

A landlord may bring an action in ejectment when a condition in the lease has been violated, however, if only a covenant in the lease has been violated, the landlord's only remedy is an action for damages. See Hager Realty Corp. v. Edison Parking Corp., 8 D. & C. 3d 89, 92 (1977), Williams v. Notopolis, 259 Pa. 296, 103 A. 290 (1918). This breach of a condition constitutes forfeiture under the Act, and remains a substantive cause of action. The breach must be substantial and material to constitute a forfeiture allowing ejectment. See Barraclough v. Atlantic Refining Co., 230 Pa.Super. 276, 326 A.2d 477 (1974). The burden of proof is on the landlord to show that the breach is material. See Easton Theaters v. Wells Fargo Land & Mortgage Co., 265 Pa.Super. 334, 401 A.2d 1333 (1982). Technical breaches, such as the inadvertent failure to sign a rent check, do not constitute a breach of the lease, and are not grounds for ejectment. See Brown v. Brown, 164 Pa.Super. 350, 64 A.2d 506 (1949).

3. Nonpayment of rent.

Also, Pennsylvania law has substantively acknowledged an action in ejectment for nonpayment of rent. See Goodwin v. Rodriguez, 520 Pa. 296 554 A.2d 6 (1989). If a landlord wants to evict for non-payment of rent he is required to affirmatively demand unpaid rent to be paid. See Elizabethtown Lodge #596 Loyal Order of Moose v. Ellis, 137 A.2d 286, 391 Pa. 19 (1958). See also Wofford v. Vavreck, 22 D&C 3rd 444 (1981). A landlord may maintain a judgment in ejection for a holdover tenant, providing that the lease was not renewed by the conduct of the landlord. Courts have determined that the mere acceptance of rent by a landlord does not necessarily constitute an affirmance of a lease renewal, but is merely evidence of the affirmance, which may be rebutted by proof that such was not the intention of the parties. See Peterson v. Schultz, 162 Pa. Super. 466 (1948).

4. Conviction under the Controlled Substances Act.

Finally, the Act was amended in 1990 to allow ejectment of tenants having convictions under the Controlled Substances Act. See 68 P.S. § 250.505-A. Ejectment is warranted when the tenant is first convicted of selling, manufacturing, or distributing drugs on the premises, when he is convicted twice for any other drug charge involving the residence, or upon seizure by law enforcement of drugs on the premises.

B. Procedure

Under the Act, Section 250.501 has specific notice provisions allowing either fifteen or thirty days from date of service for the tenant to vacate the property. Notice to vacate the property must be served upon the tenant, either by personal service, or posting the notice upon the premises. The notice must specify the time the tenant has to vacate the property. If the grounds for ejectment are expiration of the term or a breach of the lease, the tenant has 30 days to vacate from a lease of less than one year or for an indefinite term. The tenant has three months to vacate from a lease of one year or longer. If the grounds are the failure to pay rent, the tenant has 15 days to vacate if notice is given between April 1 and September 1; if notice is given between September 1 and April 1, the Tenant has 30 days to vacate. If the grounds are illegal drug use, the tenant has 15 days to vacate.

The notice to quit must be served by posting on the property or by personal service. See Section 250.501. Service by mail has been found to be ineffective. See Pakyz v. Weiser, 15 Adams L. J. 196 (1969). The notice may be waived through a provision in the lease. Once the tenant is notified of the landlord's desire to eject him, and he does not vacate in the allotted time, the landlord must file the action with the District Justice in which the leased premises are located. The form used is the Landlord-Tenant Complaint, and it contains the same allegations as used in an action to collect unpaid rent. The Complaint must aver that notice was correctly given, otherwise, the landlord may face reversal of any judgment. See Patrzcia Broz. v. McKeefry, 38 D.& C. 2d 149 (1966). If the claim includes damages for unpaid rent, the amount must be under the jurisdictional limit of the District Justice. See Ryder v. Prospect Park Realty Co., 206 Pa.Super. 108, 211 A/2d 53 (1965). If the claim for damages is over the limit, a separate action must be brought in Common Pleas court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1515(3). The value of the residence in question is irrelevant to jurisdiction.
Following a favorable ruling by a District Justice, the Justice will enter a Judgment for Possession within five days of the hearing, and the landlord then may request an Order for Possession after fifteen days in commercial leases, ten in residential leases, which is served upon the tenant by the sheriff. The landlord must also mail a copy to the tenant. Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 514-517. If the tenant does not vacate within fifteen days for commercial leases, 11 days for residential leases, the sheriff may forcibly remove him. Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 519. Yet, if the ground for eviction was failure to pay rent, the tenant may avoid eviction by paying the sheriff the costs of the proceeding along with the rent in arrears. See Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 518.

RECOVERY FOR INJURY TO REVERSION

A. Substantive Law

In any leasehold the owner of the property has an interest in reversion after the term of the lease expires. Thus, if a tenant damages premises during the term of the leasehold the landlord can sue for damage to his reversion interests. If however, the damage was caused by a misrepresentation on behalf the lessor or and agent of the lessor the lessee is not responsible for such damage. For example, in Nadolny v. Scoratow, 412 Pa. 488 (1963), the lessee leased premises for the storage of precast stone. After the lessee moved the stone in to the second floor of the building, the floor buckled because it was unable to support the weight. The lessor sued for unpaid rents and the amount of damage to the second the floor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a grant of the trial court to open the judgment to allow the lessee to show that the lessor affirmed that the floor could handle the weight required by the stone. The court relied on Highmont Music Corporation v. JM Hoffman Company, 397 Pa. 345, 155 A.2d 363 (1955) for the purpose that misrepresentation on behalf of a lessor when relied upon by a lessee may negate the lessee's responsibility for damages in light of such reliance.

B. Procedure

The procedure to follow in a suit for damages such as this is identical to that used in the other District Justice actions, in that the same Landlord-Tenant Complaint form is used, and the same timetable is followed. Once the judgment has been rendered, the landlord may effect the judgment through a levy or wage garnishment. See Post-Judgment Remedies, supra.

ASSUMPSIT AFTER ABANDONMENT

A. Substantive Law

If a tenant abandons property, a landlord has the right to collect damages for the term of the abandonment until either the lease expires, or the premises are re-rented. Whether a tenant has abandoned a piece of property is a question of fact for the judge or the jury to decide. See Brill v. Haifetz, 158 Pa. Super. 158 (1945) ("Whether there has been a surrender by operation of law depends on the intention of the parties to be deduced from their words and acts and is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. The burden of proof is on the party alleging a surrender by operation of law to prove it and where it is to be inferred from circumstances or conduct inconsistent with intention to perform the proof must be clear.") More precisely, an abandonment of leased premises is a forfeiture, which as a matter of law justifies immediate possession by the landlord. See Girard Trust Company v. Tremblay Motor Company, 291 Pa. 507, 140 A. 506 (1928). In a case of abandonment where the lessor relets the property for a lower yet reasonable rate he can also get damages in the amount between the reasonable rate received and the actual rate of the lease. See id. In any event, the landlord need not attempt to mitigate his damages by affirmatively attempting to re-rent the property following the forfeiture. See Stonehedge Square Limited Partnership v. Movie Merchants, Inc., 685 A.2d 1019, 454 Pa.Super. 468, appeal allowed in part, 696 A.2d 805, 548 Pa. 228, affirmed, 715 A.2d 1082, 552 Pa. 412 (1998).

B. Procedure

The procedure is identical to that used to recover nonpayment of rent. In a situation of abandonment, a landlord may have a common law right to re-renter the abandoned premises using self-help. Iaye v. Philadelphia Company, 193 Pa. 451, 44 A. 555 (1899). See also Turnway Corporation v. Soffer, 461 Pa. 447, 336 A.2d 871 (1975), and Self-Help, supra.

DISTRESS AND DISTRAINT

A. Substantive Law

Section 250.302 of the Landlord Tenant Act gives a landlord the power to distrain for rent, in other words, to sell a tenant's belongings in order to satisfy arrearages. The process of distraint is identical in outcome to a lien in which the landlord has an interest in personal belongings contained on the leasehold property. See Kinney v. Rosso, 5 D&C 3rd 521 (Law. Cty. 1977). The Pennsylvania Landlord Tenant Act in Section 250.302 employs a two step process in which a landlord can assert control over a tenant's goods for non-payment of rent. First, the property may be seized under levy by the landlord upon a violation of the rent provisions of the lease. The statute does not specify the manner of levy, but the landlord padlocking the doors of the building may accomplish this. The seizure need only be technical, and need not be by force. See Stern's TRICKETT, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 194 (3d Ed. 1974). Second, after the seizure, the statute gives the landlord the authority to take possession of the property and dispose of it as he wishes after five days.
The process of distraint has been the source of much litigation on the grounds that it is unconstitutional and violative of constitutional due process. Cases holding that distraint is violative of due process focus on the fact that prior notice and a prior hearing are not given to tenants before their property is ultimately sold to pay back rent. See Allegheny Clarklift v. Woodline Industries of Pennsylvania, 514 A.2d 606, 356, Pa. Super. 269 (1986). Originally, the Federal Courts invalidated the sale provisions of this statute on the grounds that they fail to provide notice and a hearing. See Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (D.C.Pa. 1970). The other provisions however, including the levy provisions, were specifically upheld in the Federal Courts as posing no threat to Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. See also Sellers v. Contino, 327 Fed. Supp. 230 (D.C. Pa. 1971). The rationale in those cases is that the levy does not permanently deprive a tenant of property, whereas a sheriff's sale does. See McCumber v. Arduini, 17 D. & C. 3d 6 (Erie Cty. 1980). But, the indefinite deprivation of a tenant's property has been seen as the same as a sale, thus invoking due process protection. See id. Since the sale of property must be within a short time after distress under the statute, one court has stated that since "the very sections which authorize action by either constables or sheriffs are considered constitutionally infirm, ... as a practical effect, no physical seizure of a tenant's property is likely in the future [to be considered constitutional]."

Some Federal Court opinions have held the entire section of the statute regarding the distraint provisions unconstitutional as a whole, because of the landlord's mere ability to levy the tenant's property without any notice or hearing. See Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.Pa. 1972) vacated 496 F. 2d. 11 53 (3rd Cir. 1974). Contrarily, other decisions have upheld the constitutionality of the entire section. See In Re Egg crate Incorporated Bankruptcy (W.D. Pa. 1989) 105 BR 283. Most of the cases upholding the constitutionality rely on the fact that distraint has been a common law remedy in Pennsylvania long before the enactment of the 14th Amendment. Therefore, the Landlord and Tenant Act does not delegate to private parties sovereign powers, but merely regulates how those powers are to be used. See SMI Industries, Inc. v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 481 F. Supp 459 (D.C. 1979). Because of the unsettled nature of the question of the distraint provisions' constitutionality, it can only be assured that a posting of a notice of levy may be the sole constitutional provision of the distraint statute. See McCumber, 17 D. &. C. 3d at 12.

B. Procedure

After the landlord determines that the tenant has breached the lease by failing to pay rent, the landlord must notify the tenant, levy the property, and give the tenant five days in which to pay his back rent. See Section 205.302. Section 250.308 allows the landlord to make an appraisal of the property if the tenant fails to pay his rent due and owing within five days after distress and notice thereof. After the appraisal, Section 250.309 allows a sheriff or other officer to fix a day, time and place of sale for the property that has been levied. Any proceeds over the cost of the appraisement and sale and the satisfaction of rent are to be returned to the tenant. Section 250.311 allows a landlord to sue for damages when distrained property has been illegally removed before its sale. Under this provision a landlord can get treble damages from anyone who destroys or damages such property. 250.312 also imposes liability upon a landlord in cases of improper distress.

Section 250.309 requires five days' notice be given to the tenant by mail or by posting upon the premises before the distrained property is sold. The notice must contain the cause of the taking and specify the date of levy and what personal property has been distrained. The landlord must also inform the tenant of the amount of rent in arrears. Sections 250.401 through 250.404 exempt certain pieces of personal property from the distress and distrain provisions under certain circumstances.

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT

A. Substantive Law

Leases may contain provisions for confession of judgment for money damages, for possession, or for both. See Hetnick v. Heicher, 70 D. & C. 612 (1950). These provisions allow a landlord to obtain a monetary judgment against a tenant swiftly and efficiently by filing in Common Pleas court. Pennsylvania requires a clear understanding by a tenant of a confession clause before a landlord may obtain relief under such a provision. Because the confession is essentially a waiver of due process, the tenant must make an intelligent and informed waiver, or the confession of judgment is unconstitutional. See Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F.Supp. 1091 (E.D.Pa. 1970), affirmed, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). See also North Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Shultz, 250 Pa.Super. 530, 378 A.2d 1275 (1977). Consent can be shown by the fact that a tenant is a businessman with experience, and that the clause is conspicuous. See Provio Leasing Corp. v. Safin, 265 Pa.Super. 423, 402 A.2d 510 (1979). Also, when a tenant holds over in a tenancy, and the lease renews, the landlord must show that the renewal of the lease included the confession clause. See Baederwood Shopping Center v. St. George & Co., 103 Montg. Co. L.R. 84 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 262 Pa.Super. 55, 396 A.2d 642 (1978). A confession of judgment clause may be used by a landlord only once, even if the clause states otherwise, unless the Rules of Civil Procedure otherwise allow. See General Neon Signs Outdoor Advertising Div. V. Steer Inn Sys., Inc., 46 D. & C. 702 (1969).

B. Procedure

In order to confess judgment for money, the landlord must either file the original instrument authorizing confession with the Prothonotary, or file a complaint with the Common Pleas Court, in the form prescribed by Rule 2952. See Pa.R.C.P. 2951(b). If the original instrument is filed, it is usually accompanied by a praecipe allowing the Prothonotary to enter judgment immediately. This method may only be used when the amount due is evident on the face of the instrument.

If a complaint must be used, it must contain a copy of the lease, or a reason why one cannot be attached, the grounds for confession, and an itemization of damages. Judgment may be entered without giving the defendant opportunity to answer. See Penn State Mutual Ins. Co. v. Burglar's Enemy, Inc., 263 Pa.Super. 89, 397 A.2d 10 (1979). If the confession is for possession, and not money, the complaint must contain a description of the property and demand for ejectment. See Pa.R.C.P. 2952, 2970-74. A form of confession of judgment must be filed in accordance with Rule 2955, after which the Prothonotary shall enter judgment. After judgment has been entered, the Prothonotary gives written notice to the defendant, according to Rule 236. The tenant then has the opportunity to open or strike the judgment, following the procedures listed in Rule 2959. Execution upon the judgment is allowed by Rule 3101, et. seq, which is commenced by filing a praecipe and a writ of execution with the Prothonotary in the county in which the judgment has been entered. Then, the sheriff to satisfy the judgment sells the property in the premises, or the sheriff forcibly ejects the tenant. Notice must be provided to the tenant at least six days prior to the sheriff's action. The confession may be for both money and possession, but the landlord may not recover both accelerated rent to the end of the term and possession. See Greco v. Woodlawn Furniture Co., 99 Pa.Super. 290 (1930).

SELF-HELP

A. Substantive Law

It has long been established in Pennsylvania common law, that the landlord has a right to re-enter property without the assistance of legal process, in the event that the tenant voluntarily abandons the property or otherwise materially breaches the lease. See Mayer v. Chelten Av. Book Corp., 321 Pa. 193, 183 A.2d 773 (1936); Clarenbach v. Giordano, 11 D. & C. 3d 195, 198 (1970). The Restatement (Second) of property holds the same position. See § 14.2 comment g (1977). Pennsylvania courts have held that the landlord must prove 1) that the tenant had the intent to abandon the property, and 2) that the tenant engaged in conduct to carry out that intention. See Turnway Corp. v. Soffer, 461 Pa. 447, 336 A.2d 871 (1975). Other cases interpreting a landlord's right to self-help in circumstances other than abandonment have noted that a landlord may forcibly dispossess a tenant, as long as no excessive force is used. See Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 Watts and Serg, 90 (Pa. 1841); Huggins v. Bridges, 29 Pa.Super. 82 (1905).

Yet, courts and treatises have shown disapproval of self-help in recent years. The Restatement (Second) of Property generally disapproves of self-help repossession; especially when there is a statutory speedy judicial remedy. Some courts have held that self-help disturbs the public peace, and is therefore discouraged. See Wofford v. Vavreck, 22 D. & C. 3d 444 (Craw. Cty. 1981). Several common pleas courts have granted injunctions to tenants who were evicted by self-help methods. See Wofford, 22 D. & C. 3d 444, citing Perine v. Novay, (Alleg. Co. 1975), Ebersole v. Narehood, (Perry Cty. 1975), Buffington v. Ballester (Chest. Cty. 1976), Venezia v. Stake (Frank. Cty. 1977), Bentzel v. Pennebaker, (Dauph Cty. 1975), Morrison v. Brungard (Lyc. Cty. 1974). Additionally, with the advent of the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, following Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979), tenants may have very real defenses to eviction, which can be denied them in situations of landlord self-help. See also Wofford, 22 D. & C. 3d at 445.

B. Procedure

The procedure involved in self-help is obvious-the landlord must simply avail himself of his passkey and enter the property. The only caveat to this is the requirement that the landlord not use excessive force upon re-entry.

POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES

Following a favorable judgment by the District Justice, a landlord may be able to attach a tenant's wages to satisfy a judgment. The landlord must wait until the expiration of the appeal period, and if no appeal is filed, file a Praecipe to Enter Judgment with the Court of Common Pleas of the county of the District Justice's jurisdiction. The Prothonotary will keep the original copy, and the landlord must send one to the tenant by first class mail. The landlord must attach a copy of the District Justice order and a certificate of service. See Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 402(d). Then, the tenant's wages may be garnished under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8127(a)(3.1). In order to garnish wages, the landlord must, after entering judgment, file a Petition to Attach Wages Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8127(a)(3.1), summarizing the grounds for attachment. The procedure is for the Prothonotary to enter a Rule to Show Cause, which the tenant has ten days to respond to. After ten days, the court may enter an order to attach wages, which must be provided to the employer within 14 days.

A successful landlord may also execute a judgment against the personal property of the tenant separate from wages, such as that remaining in the residence. The procedure governing execution of a judgment in Common Pleas court is found in Pa.R.C.P. 3101 et.seq., and is similar to the wage garnishment procedure.

APPEALS

Following judgment, either party may request a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas. In judgments for possession, the appeal window is ten days; for money judgments, thirty days. See Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1002. If the appellant was the plaintiff in the prior action, he must file a complaint within twenty days after filing the appeal. If the appellant was the defendant, he must request the Prothonotary to enter a rule against the plaintiff to file a complaint; after issue of this rule the plaintiff has thirty days in which to file. See Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1004. When a tenant appeals a possession judgment entered against him, he is required to post bond with the Prothonotary equal to three months' rent in order for the appeal filing to act as a supersedeas of the initial judgment. He is also required to deposit money or bond as time passes in order to satisfy the rent, which sums are periodically let out to the landlord in satisfaction of the tenant's rent obligation. The landlord, however, must request such allocation. See Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1008.

If you would like to discuss any of the remedies set forth above in further detail or have general questions regarding landlord/tenant relationships, please contact Thomas J. Nehilla at tnehilla@rhoads-sinon.com.